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Abstract

Few sources have survived relating to the borough of Sunderland in the seventeenth century. However, during the Civil Wars Sunderland was noticed for its support of Parliament and the Scottish Covenanters. A Puritan elite, led by George Lilburne, had established Sunderland as a radical borough by the 1630s. Good relations between Sunderland and the Covenanting Scots began in 1639 and continued throughout the Bishops' Wars (1639-41) and the first British Civil Wars (1642-46). This was unusual in the North East of England as most of County Durham, Northumberland and Newcastle upon Tyne would remain loyal to King Charles I. A trade blockade of Newcastle, Sunderland and Blyth during 1643-4 was quickly lifted at Sunderland after the Scots garrisoned the town in March 1644. This gave Sunderland a temporary, but advantageous, lead over their rivals in Newcastle. Sunderland's port was crucial for supplying the Scottish Covenanting army and Parliamentary forces during 1644-46 and the coal mines along the River Wear proved a vital source of revenue for paying the army. The borough's leaders were well rewarded for their loyalty and, unlike other leading supporters of Parliament in the North, they did not object to paying for the Scottish occupation of the North East.

Keywords: Sunderland; Scottish Covenanters; Civil Wars; Coal trade; George Lilburne; Newcastle upon Tyne

The Scottish Covenanters and the Borough of Sunderland, 1639-1647: a Hidden

Axis of the British Civil Wars*

For a few years in the mid seventeenth century Sunderland, a relatively small coastal borough, became prominent in national affairs. Sunderland was arguably pivotal to the support and supply of the Scottish Covenanting army and Parliamentary forces during the mid 1640s. This had implications for the success of these armies against Royalist forces in the North of England. Without access to the wealth of the coal mines along the River Wear, and the port of Sunderland, the Covenanters might have had to turn back and the war could have taken a different course.

Sunderland's place in the wars was first highlighted many decades ago by Charles S. Terry in *The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven* (1899) and in his edited *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant 1643-1647* (1917). Henry W. Meikle's *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in London, 1644-1646* (1917) also noted the borough's significance.¹ Sunderland then faded from histories of the wars and later-twentieth-century studies tended to focus on the military impact upon the much larger city of Newcastle upon Tyne, rather than other boroughs in the North East of England. Examples include Ian Gentles', *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653* (1994) and Roger Howell's, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution, A Study of the Civil War in North England* (1967). Lawrence Kaplan's, *Politics and Religion during the English Revolution, The Scots and the Long Parliament 1643-1645* (1976) makes little reference Sunderland either.² Edward Furgol's *Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 1639-1651* (1990) and Mark Fissel's, *The Bishops' Wars, Charles I's campaigns against Scotland 1638-1640* (1994) did briefly note campaigns near Sunderland, but did not

probe the importance of this port for supplying the armies. The overall paucity of references to Sunderland in later-twentieth-century historiography has been somewhat remedied in the early twenty-first century by the work of Matthew Greenhall, P. Whillis and Maureen Meikle and Christine Newman.³

So 'twas when Rebels had pull'd down
 The Mitre, Scepter, and the Crown,
 By way of a Moderation;
 Thieves of Commissioners of Safety
 Of all things you were worth, bereft ye,
 And most demurely talk'd of Sequestration.
 They took your Money civilly,
 And parting cry'd, the Lord be we ye;
 Without approbrious Names,
 Well knowing, that a Curse or two
 Would nothing for their Purpose do
 But spoil their After-Games;
 Because it was enough to kill,
 To covet, backbite, whore and steal...⁴

Sunderland's republican stance during the British Civil Wars was still remembered in this satirical poem of 1710. That Sunderland would take a radically different path from the mostly conservative North East of England during this turbulent time in history was evident from the 1630s onwards. Sunderland's Puritan oligarchy had rejected the Bishop of Durham's attempts to control their borough in the 1630s and stood defiantly against the introduction of Arminianism and levying of ship money. They did indeed pull 'down the mitre, sceptre and crown' during the 1640s and were able to do so with military support from Scotland and Parliament, as well as backing from Parliament and financiers in the City of London.

The Bishops' Wars

Sunderland had first been noted for its strategic importance during the Bishops' Wars that began when the Scottish Covenanting army raising its banner at Duns Law in Berwickshire on 5 June 1639. There was no invasion of England at this time as a truce was negotiated with King Charles, whose forces were encamped near Berwick upon Tweed. The Covenanters were led by Alexander Leslie (later Earl of Leven). They were feared as their ranks included many battle-hardened Scots who had fought for Sweden in the Thirty Years' War.⁵ Being a Puritan-led borough Sunderland was sympathetic to the aims of the Covenanters, who wanted to protect their Presbyterian faith against the Episcopalian designs of Charles I. There had been contact between these parties via George Stevenson. He was a servant of the powerful and prosperous Sunderland merchant, George Lilburne, who was also an uncle of the Leveller leader John Lilburne.

Thomas Triplet the self-righteous rector of Whitburn near Sunderland who was an instrument of the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Laud, called Lilburne and George Grey, another prosperous Sunderland trader, 'the two most arrant covenanters and dangerous boutefeus [incendiaries] that are in these parts' in February 1640.⁶ Triplet knew that Lilburne was being tried before the Ecclesiastical High Commission at Durham for his stance against Arminianism at his local parish church, St Michael and All Angels, Bishopwearmouth near Sunderland. His opposition to ship money and 'defence of the Covenanters in Scotland' also made Lilburne a marked man. Grey had been arrested for orchestrating a tenants' petition against increased entry fines, presented to the Dean and Chapter of Durham in 1639.⁷ Grey and Lilburne were released and proceeded to attack Triplet through their London contact Giles Baggs, a wealthy coal merchant. He reported 'that

Thomas Triplet had done a very ill office in the North, having brought two very honest men into great trouble and charges, so that they have endured long imprisonment and spent at least £50 apiece'. Lilburne and Grey appeared before the Privy Council

where the King himself was present ... they are come off with a great deal of credit, insomuch that the King himself gave them thanks for the pains they had taken in the cause, and now they are suitors to the King and Council that they may have remedy against Thomas Triplet, with whom the Bishop of Durham and all the gentlemen of the country are much offended⁸

To his credit the Bishop of Durham, Thomas Morton, refused to be involved in Triplet's vendetta against Lilburne and Grey.⁹ Morton was not overly concerned with punishing Puritans within his diocese and as Prince Bishop he had granted Sunderland a charter of incorporation in 1634 in recognition of the borough's growing economic prosperity.¹⁰

Economic links between Sunderland and the City of London were strong as the capital imported the majority of coal produced by mines along the River Wear. London merchants also extended capital to Sunderland's mercantile elite to secure the leases of these mines. Sunderland's leaders shared their Puritan ideology with many London merchants, a fact not unnoticed by Triplet in his continued vendetta against Lilburne. Undaunted by the Privy Council's leniency Triplet insisted that Sunderland's leaders would 'learn southern disobedience' in June 1640, and he determined to uncover Lilburne as a Covenanter.¹¹ By July it was rumoured that the Scots 'plot is to be master over the Tyne and Sunderland, and by stopping the coal trade to compel the King and Kingdom of England to grant them more than ever yet they desired'.¹² This link between the Scottish Covenanters and the coal wealth of the Tyne and Wear was real enough and would surface in the Second Bishops' War

that began in August 1640. This time the Scots did cross the Border into North East England.

The alleged Scottish Covenanter threat to set light to the collieries along the Tyne and Wear proved to be unfounded as these mines were far more useful to them in working order.¹³ Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, was concerned about the royal army's slowness to respond to this invasion and ordered Mountjoy Blount, Earl of Newport, to 'issue arms from Hull and speed up deliveries to Sunderland, so that the full number of regiments could get to the front and Newcastle be safeguarded'.¹⁴ This attempt was futile for, after the battle of Newburn on 28 August, Newcastle was occupied. Bishop Morton reported on 30 August that

there is a ship laden with the King's ordnance about to come into the harbour of Sunderland, and I am in great doubt that there are Covenanters' spies in that town who will give immediate intelligence to the rebels if they come within the bar, that they may be surprised.¹⁵

Morton's fears about Covenanter activity in Sunderland were realised with an audacious raid on 7 September 1640. 'They came with four troops of horse, Lord Yester commanding them, at 12 o'clock at night and took away £70 of the King's money.' The Scots actually took £840 which would have been a major blow to the local customs collector, though the pro-Scots merchants of Sunderland would not have been sorry to see a much hated tax purloined. The Covenanters then took control of the borough without opposition.¹⁶

General Alexander Leslie apprehended 'the Receiver of his Majesty's Customs' at Sunderland on 11 September 1640 to intercept further custom's revenues.¹⁷ On 23 September a 'proclamation by the Scots army at Sunderland' ordered that from 29 September those who were of the Protestant religion in

County Durham were to make themselves known to the army, so that they would be 'tenderly dealt with' and not have their hay and corn disturbed. If they did not do this they could be labelled enemies of Protestantism and have their crops seized for the army's use.¹⁸ The Covenanting army were demanding £25,000 from Durham, Northumberland and Newcastle to pay for their occupation and they remained in the area until 1641 with Viscount Maitland's Foot being stationed in Sunderland during January 1641.¹⁹ The Scots' interest in the coal trade and its revenues was reinforced when 'General Leslie and Sandy (Colonel Alexander) Hamilton, their Lord General of the Ordnance ... visited the ports of Tynemouth, Sunderland, and Hartlepool' in February 1641.²⁰ The Scottish army returned north after a peace treaty was signed at Ripon in October 1641, but their knowledge of North East England, and Sunderland in particular, would serve them well in the ensuing British Civil Wars of 1642-46.²¹

Sunderland versus the bishop of Durham

In early 1642 a heady mix of religion and politics was unsettling Sunderland's civic leadership. There was considerable opposition to John Johnson, rector of Bishopwearmouth and chaplain to Bishop Morton, who had not preached to his parishioners whilst the Scots army resided near Sunderland. In defiance of the Bishop, the people of Sunderland wanted to employ one of the preachers they had heard during the Scottish occupation, Timothy Batt.²² As Mayor of Sunderland George Lilburne used Sunderland's protestation return to the House of Commons on 23 February to gain support for Batt against the might of the Bishop. These returns were required by Parliament to prove loyalty to the government and the Protestant religion: 262 Sunderland men assented to this petition with only 17 absent as they were at sea.²³ On 26 February Lilburne triumphed as the House of Commons ordered

that 'Mr. Timothy Batt, an orthodox Divine, be appointed Lecturer, to preach every Sunday in the Afternoon, and every Wednesday in the Week, in Bishop Wearmouth Church, being the Parish Church, the Port of Sunderland ...' Lilburne's victory was short lived though as his continued support for Puritanism would land him in more trouble with Church authority and by March 1643 Timothy Batt had moved to Illminster.²⁴

Civil War begins

By late August 1642, with the threat of war looming, Parliamentary ammunition was reported to have arrived in Sunderland aboard a 'Flemish Pink'.²⁵ Parliament feared that it would fall into Royalist hands, but nothing more is known of this cargo. Sunderland's civic leaders would have demonstrated their opposition to the King and his Royalist forces when war did finally break out on 23 October 1642. George Lilburne's hostility was noted for 'before the late wars, (he) was deeply engaged against the tyrannical power of the late King in point of ship-money'. Lilburne naturally supported the cause of Parliament by promoting

its interest in the Northern Counties, being justice of the peace, and held meetings and tried to raise forces to oppose those being raised in 1642 for the King. In October [he] opposed the Commission of Array at hazard of his life at the Sessions House, Durham [and] had to fly for his life.²⁶

The Royalist William Cavendish, Earl of Newcastle, sought Lilburne's arrest 'as puritan, rogue and roundhead' and 'the greatest enemy in those parts.' Lilburne however 'stole away ... and went to Edinburgh to ask help of Pickering, Parliament's agent there' proving that his links with the Scots were still strong and very convenient.²⁷ He returned home on his wife's assurance that Sir William Lambton would protect him, but on 11 November he 'was seized, brought to Durham, robbed of all he had, and

taken to York, where he was kept 14 months, resisting the offers of Ralph Lambton to have him liberated, if he would contribute to the earl of Newcastle's forces'. Lambton noted that Lilburne 'would rot in prison rather than assist against Parliament'.²⁸ The sixty-year-old Lilburne had been 'marched through mire and dirt to York' and thus missed the early events of the Civil Wars in the North East, but his fellow Puritans in Sunderland continued to support the cause of Parliament.²⁹

Like many other English boroughs Sunderland would have been fortified during 1642-3, though details about this are scarce. The borough had a harbour and a naturally defensive riverbank, but had no town walls as it had never been a large settlement in medieval times. Some defences would also have appeared along the North Sea coast, but there was no real fortification at this time. These preparations were slight in comparison to the defences built up around towns like Gloucester, Reading and Shrewsbury.³⁰

Blockading the coal trade

Parliament began to debate coal shipments from the Tyne and Wear in January 1643. It was concerned about opposition from the pro-Royalist garrison at Newcastle. The Earl of Newcastle was threatening to impose a tax on every ship loading coals to support the Royalist cause. The House of Lords feared that coal pits would 'be quite lost, and become irrecoverable' and that London would be unable to get necessary supplies of coal from elsewhere.³¹ An order was made on 14 January 1643 for 'stopping the Coal Trade to Newcastle'. It noted 'the number of ships and quantity of money that is every year employed, from *London* and other parts and places of this kingdom, for the fetching of coals and salt' from the Tyne and Wear.³² Unfortunately for Sunderland the ban included their borough and Blyth in

Northumberland. This meant that no coal could legally be shipped from these ports to London and neither were supply ships allowed to enter them until Royalist Newcastle fell into Parliament's hands. Any vessel trying to go to these ports after 1 February 1643 would 'be seized upon and stayed in such port and place where they come in'.³³ It looked as though Sunderland was being punished, despite its loyalty to Parliament. However, Parliament had not anticipated that this blockade would last long for Newcastle had been in economic decline during the later 1630s and early 1640s.³⁴

The effect of the blockade upon Sunderland's domestic and foreign trade was immediate. As coal supplies were prevented from reaching London, coal became scarce there and prices rose alarmingly. Instead of being loaded into keel boats coals were heaped up along the banks of the Wear. Some ships managed to evade the sanctions in the summer of 1643, arguing that bad weather on a voyage to Scotland made them take shelter at Sunderland. Ships could make huge profits on coal cargoes for the price reached a record 23 shillings per chaldron in the coal starved south of England. Parliament tried to argue, ineffectively, that any coal from Sunderland should be sold for the benefit of the poor. Even coal-fired beacons that warned shipping of rocks began to run short of fuel in June 1643, but the blockade continued as Newcastle was still defiant.³⁵

The Covenanted Army returns

The garrison at Newcastle ignored the Solemn League and Covenant agreed between the Parliaments of England and Scotland in August and September 1643. This League would have consequences for the Royalists in the North as it agreed to a Scottish army coming into England to fight for 'the preservation and reformation of religion,

the true honour and happiness of the King, and the public peace and liberty of his dominions'.³⁶ Sir William Armine, a prominent Parliamentarian, urged the Scottish Covenanted army to invade northern England and attack Newcastle and other Royalist strongholds. Armine would become the resident Parliamentarian commissioner at Sunderland in March 1644.³⁷

The Scottish Covenanted army, led by the Earl of Leven, duly crossed the Border into England on 18 January 1644 and the newly-created Marquis of Newcastle hurried north to oppose them. There were skirmishes near Corbridge in Northumberland and Prudhoe in County Durham during February 1644. They then headed east and crossed the River Wear at the Chester New Bridge on 2 March 1644.³⁸ A contradictory Royalist account wrongly stated that they crossed the Tyne and were 'forced' into Sunderland by their army.³⁹ Chester New Bridge was the only bridge across the Wear between Durham and the North Sea and it would have given the Scots 'a very inconvenient passage had it been disputed'.⁴⁰ Although Newcastle was their ultimate aim, the Scots always intended to head for Sunderland. On 19 February 1644 the Scottish Parliamentary Commissioners wrote to the Committee of the Army noting

There is £4,000 worth of butter and cheese already embarked in the Thames to be sent unto you with the first occasion to the port of Sunderland, if there shall not be safe entry into Newcastle, whereof so soon as it shall please God to make you masters, we entreat your Lordships to send £2,000 worth of coal for the poor of the City, which will be very acceptable to all here, and will much conduce to public ends.⁴¹

On March 2 according to Mr Robert Douglas, a minister who travelled with the Scottish forces, the Covenanted army quartered at 'Mid-Harraton' on the north bank of the Wear for two nights.⁴² They were desperate for supplies and headed

towards Sunderland upon 'receiving intelligence that we should have that Haven secured ...' After 'resting the Lords day, the Enemy crossed the River ... so we entered [Sunderland] on Monday [4 March] without striking one blow.'⁴³

They had 'crossed the river Wear in two divisions, one at Hylton and the other at the ford of Ford Hall'. They then united and marched 'by the Willow Pond, down Silksworth Row, past Bishopwearmouth Church, to take up its position in Sunderland High Street'.⁴⁴ After their welcome from the borough's councillors the soldiers camped 'on the open [unenclosed] ground between Bishopwearmouth and Sunderland'.⁴⁵ By 12 March Sunderland had been properly fortified 'and a garrison settled therein' on the Pann Field. It was a good defensive site, for the Scots had enclosed their camp on the three landward sides. The river side did not need defences as it overlooked a steep and craggy bank with the Pann Sand shoal below blocking any attacks from the Wear. The opposite ground of Monkwearmouth shore was low and flat, making the camp unassailable by enemy artillery from there.⁴⁶

Military occupation

Sunderland was therefore 'a place which proved full of advantages to the Army'. The Scots had 'fortified Sunderland as well as the place was capable'⁴⁷ and appointed Quartermaster General Ludovick Leslie as their military governor.⁴⁸ The Scots took over the ammunition left by fleeing Royalists. Another Scottish garrison was established on the opposite side of the Wear at Monkwearmouth from the 5 March until September 1644. Both garrisons were therefore dug in and well supplied with arms for any impending attacks. The Sunderland and Monkwearmouth garrisons were fairly small as the Scots army only amounted to '18,000 foot and 3,500 horse' in total. They also had to be highly mobile to cope with the demands of war as

skirmishes could occur anywhere, at any time.⁴⁹ The church towers at Bishopwearmouth and Monkwearmouth were used as watch towers to spot and rebuff Royalist raiding parties.

Even though the garrisons were small they were well supplied with munitions. The surviving army accounts list all the gunpowder, matches, musket balls, cannonballs, mattocks and spades provided to them.⁵⁰ The Scots army also brought many weapons with them and had received 3000 arms and 300 barrels of powder from Parliament through Hartlepool in late February.⁵¹ Further supplies came from Scotland as 30,000 matches, 10,000 musket balls and 10 cwt of powder were ordered to be sent from the Edinburgh public magazine to Sunderland on 18 March 1644.⁵² Armed keel boats were evidently at the Scots' disposal as well for on 12 June Edward Philpotts claimed thirty 3lb cannonballs and eighteen 'fadons of 3 inch tard towes [linen fuses] for the close keel.' Cannons were later situated along the riverbanks for on 7 September Henry Gislingham took '50 powder, 75 musketballs and 9 3lb cannonballs for the river.'⁵³

[Insert Map here]

[Caption for map - Military manoeuvres in and around Sunderland, 1644]

Counter attack

The Scots initial delight at taking Sunderland on 4 March was short lived. A Royalist counter-attack began at one o'clock on 6 March with a skirmish near Chester New Bridge. Accounts of this encounter naturally differ according to which side they emanated from, but Royalist troops definitely crossed the bridge and advanced eastwards only to be met by Scots cavalrymen near Lambton. According to the Royalists

after some bullets had been exchanged and they appeared again in greater force, we backed our party with Lord Henry [Percy's] regiment ... with whom we also sent some musketeers; which caused the enemy that day to look upon us from a farther distance. We judged they were about 500 horse when they appeared most, yet they continued most of that day in our sight.⁵⁴

On 7 March they advanced to Penshaw Hill only to be met by Scottish forces upon Humbleton Hill. The Royalists reported that the Scots were 'backward to join' in a fight, but knowing of Sunderland's strategic importance they resolved to 'march towards the town, either to possess ourselves of it or a piece of ground near unto it'.⁵⁵ Some of the Scots hastily left Humbleton Hill to fight the advancing Royalists.

The skirmish began near Offerton through 'some fields of furze and whin bushes ... three thick hedges with banks, two of which they had lined with musketeers'. The Scots had another '200 musketeers and a drake [small cannon] which flanked those hedges which were betwixt us, and from thence there ran a brook, with a great bank down to the River Weir'. Realising they were outflanked the Royalists retreated to Penshaw Hill 'where being saluted with cold blasts and snow, our horses sufferance with hunger that we seemed so far to become friends as in providing against these common enemies'.⁵⁶

Both sides faced each other again the following morning, but heavy snow showers and hungry horses made the Royalists retreat with the same sneering allegation that the enemy was 'hard to be provoked'. They refused to admit any defeat and 'sent 120 Horse to entertain them' as a diversion whilst they retreated westwards. 200 Scottish musketeers and some dragoons then apparently battled this cavalry unit who 'killed some forty of them and had taken near 100 men but they advanced so suddenly, that we could bring ... but twenty of them' away.⁵⁷

Another account gives Sir Charles Lucas's Royalist cavalry a total of seventy-four

killed and sixty-nine prisoners taken, but the Royalists themselves only admitted to one fatality and five injured men during this encounter. Some of the Scots were accused of running away, but in reality 600 Scots had counter-attacked the retreating Royalist baggage train, forcing another cavalry and musketeer fight.⁵⁸ The Royalists ruefully recorded the 'we brought our horse home very weary, which did us more harm than the enemy could'.⁵⁹

Sir Charles Lucas had brought '21 Troops from Yorkshire' and '1500 Foot, from Cumberland',⁶⁰ but even with these extra men he had failed to oust the Scots army from Sunderland. The Scots accused their enemy of sneaking away to Durham under cover of the snow storm. They returned to their quarters in Sunderland scornfully reporting that 'the enemies lying in the field two nights, was almost as bad as a battle to them, many of their men and horse dying, but more running away'.⁶¹ Nevertheless, they exaggerated when reporting that the Royalists had lost 800 horses to the cold weather.⁶² The precise geography of this encounter was recorded by Robert Douglas in his *Diary*, as he correctly identified Penshaw and Humbledon Hills as the armies' vantage points. Douglas noted Royalist casualties as '20 of them killed, 32 taken, 28 die by the way, some of their horses, many ran away'. He also observed that seven of the Scottish regiments wisely went 'to the other side Wear' on 9 March in case there was another attack from the north.⁶³

Although this encounter had been indecisive, it was the first time that the Covenanting army had made full use of its impressive artillery near Sunderland. They had in all 'eight brass 24 lbs., one brass 18 lbs., three brass 12 lbs., six iron 9 lbs., forty-two iron 3 lbs., eighty-eight case of frames [which fired several musket balls at once], and six petards'.⁶⁴ The Scottish army had thereafter split and marched

towards Durham, Hartlepool and South Shields on 12 March, but left 'two regiments at Sunderland for the security of that place.'⁶⁵ They also used Sunderland as a holding area for prisoners taken during this skirmish and from subsequent encounters in the Civil Wars, as well as Catholic prisoners from the North of England.⁶⁶

Lifting the Blockade

After word reached London that the Scots were in control of Sunderland the House of Commons immediately discussed lifting their trade blockade. On 12 March they noted that 'by the good providence and blessing of almighty God, and the endeavours of our brethren in *Scotland*, the towns and ports of *Sunderland* and *Blyth* are lately rescued out of the hands of the enemy.' They already knew about the 'extremity of want' and ordered

'that it shall and may be lawful for any person or persons, under the obedience of the king and Parliament, from henceforth, to trade and go with their ships and vessels unto either of the said ports of *Sunderland* or *Blyth*; and to carry with them arms, ammunition, corn, or any other provision of victuals, for the relief of the said inhabitants, of the armies of our said brethren of *Scotland*, or such other forces as are or shall be employed in the service of the king and Parliament ... and to make returns of coals, salt, or other merchandize, from the said several Ports.'⁶⁷

On 19 March 1644 the Commons again ordered pro-Parliamentary shipping to trade with Sunderland and Blyth in coals that were badly needed in the south. On 21 March the House of Lords also consented to freeing up shipping to Sunderland.⁶⁸

The collier fleet from Sunderland took full advantage of the resumption of trade to London, though they were accused of stalling 'betwixt this [London] and Harwich, and send in their coals by small parcels, thereby to raise the price'.⁶⁹ The renewed coal trade gave an irreversible economic opportunity to the coal merchants

of Wearside. They took full advantage of the ongoing blockade of the River Tyne to supply London where riots were feared through the lack of coal.⁷⁰

The Battle of Hylton 24-25 March, 1644

The two regiments at Sunderland had remained vigilant in their defence of the Wear whilst their comrades attacked the Royalist fort at South Shields. After this fort was captured there was no respite for a battle would take place to the west of Sunderland, near Hylton, on 24-25 March 1644. Some accounts place this battle site two miles north of Sunderland, but the fighting would actually take place between Boldon Hills, Hylton and Southwick on the north side of the Wear (see map). Scottish forces came from Monkwearmouth, Boldon and South Shields to counter attack Royalist forces. It was fortuitous that they had been reinforced by Sir James Lumsden's 3,000 troops from Northumberland on 23 March.⁷¹ Both sides had apparently taunted each other with the words 'The Lord of Hosts is with us' from the Scots in response to Newcastle's 'Now or Never'.⁷² This encounter really should be known as the battle of Hylton as the fighting took place near Hylton Castle, three miles north-west of Sunderland.

As with the skirmish at Offerton, there are conflicting accounts about this battle in surviving pamphlets and letters. The Marquis of Newcastle's forces craftily attempted to surprise the Scots camped on the north side of the Wear during sermon time on Sunday 24 March, but were spotted. According to Scottish reports Leven's Scottish army quickly drew together at 'Sudichhill' [Southwick Hill], with reinforcements at Boldon. Robert Douglas, who was embedded with the Scots at Boldon Hills, recalled that 'about 4 a clock, they began to play on both sides from hedges; we beat them from two hedges. The service is hot till 12 a clock at night ...

Many of theirs wounded sent away; they retire to the hill, we stand our ground.’ The next day the Scots did ‘plant their hedges’ whilst the Royalists concealed their retreat towards Durham by ‘casting up breast work for cannon’.⁷³

Another Scottish report noted that as it was a foggy day the enemy had hoped to surprise the Godly Scots during their Sunday service. However, hedges and ditches prevented the two armies meeting in open combat, prompting the continual cannon fire until midnight noted by Douglas. ‘Many officers, who have been old soldiers, did affirm they had never seen so long and hot service in the night time ... divers killed on both sides.’ The Scots claimed to have killed more Royalists than their side lost because of ‘the dead bodies we found the next day upon the ground, beside the seven wagons draught of dead and hurt men not able to walk that the constable of Boldon affirmed he saw carried away.’ Newcastle’s men had apparently ‘left much of their powder, match, and arms behind them’ and those who were slow to retreat were killed by the Scots including ‘some men of note’.⁷⁴

Interestingly, when this battle began the Scots had no time to muster their heavier cannon from Sunderland, but ‘by the help of the Sea-men lying in the haven, we conveyed one great piece over the water, who themselves drew it up to the field where it was to be planted.’ It was this loyalty from the seamen of Sunderland that enabled the battle cannonade to last from 4pm to midnight. This reinforced the special relationship that existed between the borough’s citizens and the Scots.⁷⁵

Royalist accounts of the battle tell of their four foot regiments fighting six ‘regiments of the rebels’ from three o’clock until night. They accused the Scots of vanishing ‘into their trenches and retirements in Sunderland’ and not coming out again until Sir Charles Lucas’s cavalry ‘forced all their horse (which is about 3000) to

hasten up the hill to their cannon, all the way doing sharp execution upon them, so as their Lancers lay plentifully upon the ground.' The Scots' cannon fire undoubtedly killed many Royalists during this encounter, but they only admitted to losing 240 'common soldiers', whilst wrongly asserting that 1000 Scots had been killed or taken prisoner. Newcastle's men were also said to have 'taken very many of their arms, especially of their Scottish pistols'. Instead of admitting to their retreat the Royalists merely mentioned that the exhausted Scots 'would by no means be entreated to show themselves'.⁷⁶ Another Royalist account erroneously declared that the battle was their victory as the Scots lancers had been routed by Lucas whilst the rest of the army fled.⁷⁷

Though the first day's fighting was inconclusive, overall victory was modestly claimed by the Scots army.⁷⁸ News quickly spread amongst Parliamentary forces fighting elsewhere of 'a great battle fought betwixt the Scots and the earl of Newcastle's forces which continued two days, but the Lord pleased to give victory to the Scots.'⁷⁹ It is unfortunate that the Scot's tendency to play down this battle accounts for its subsequent marginalization in histories of the British Civil Wars. Even in 1646 it was being dismissed as an engagement of no consequence by Edward Bowles, who also claimed that there were few casualties. This hardly tallies with Scottish army accounts that demonstrate a substantial use of gunpowder and musketballs on 24-25 March. Furgol has observed that at the Offerton skirmish and the battle at Hylton 'Leven stood on the defensive against Newcastle, because the cautious approach was safest for an army deep in enemy territory and far from a friendly army or garrison.'⁸⁰ This ignores the importance of having Sunderland as a nearby friendly supply port and garrison. Terry shrewdly noted that 'the Marquis's

despatch ... claimed at least an honourable retreat', whilst Firth states that Newcastle was conscious of his 'unsuccessful attempt to bring on a battle'.⁸¹ On 25 March, Newcastle wrote somewhat remorsefully to congratulate Prince Rupert on his successful relief of Newark whilst asking for his assistance against the Scots.

I must assure your Highness, that the Scots are as big again in foot as I am, and their horse, I doubt, much better than ours are, so that if your Highness do not please to come hither, and that very soon too, the great game of your uncle's will be endangered, if not lost.⁸²

Only William Lithgow dared to call it with hindsight, in 1645, 'that laudable victory'.⁸³

The Scots admitted to having '300 wounded, some of them slain, and others since dead to the number of 60', but alleged that 1500 of Newcastle's men were killed. Another account alleged that 4000 were 'slain' and that '16 pieces of Ordnance, and many of the enemies prisoners besides all their ammunition, bigge [foodstuffs] and baggage' were taken by the Scots. The fallen were apparently given 'an honourable burial according to their degrees' by General Leslie and 100 prisoners were taken back to Sunderland. As there is no record of these burials in the register of Bishopwearmouth church, the dead were presumably buried near the battlefield or taken to Monkwearmouth for burial.⁸⁴ On 26 March the main Scots army crossed the Wear 'by a bridge of keels at Sunderland, and the horse by a ford at Hylton House' and then quartered at Farrington Hall.⁸⁵ This use of keel boats as pontoons is rare, though specific bridge boats were used by the Earl of Essex's army at Gloucester.⁸⁶

Supplying the army: forage and plunder

With the main military actions seemingly over, the garrisons left at Sunderland still needed foodstuffs. Foraging parties from both sides were, however, unpopular with

the folk who lived in County Durham.⁸⁷ The Scots commissioners forbade 'plundering, pillaging and burning of houses' by their troops on 16 March 1644 and admitted remorse for burning what could not be removed including 'keels and their furniture to the great discredit of this cause'.⁸⁸ On 26 March the committee with the Scots army complained to London that they needed cash, for County Durham was

now a country where there is nothing left to be sequestrated, and which ... is altogether unable to supply the inhabitants, being so wasted and spoiled by the forces which have been lying and lived upon it, unless some relief come from other places unto it, we fear within a short time it shall be deserted by the inhabitants, who for the most part are old men, women and children.⁸⁹

The Scots and Royalists were thus equally to blame for this situation. As soon as they reached Sunderland the Scots had taken 'what care we could for supply of provisions in this Enemies' country, for so we find it, not receiving any intelligence or willing supply from them'.⁹⁰ Another account reiterated that the farmers of County Durham were either 'willingly or forcedly in arms against the Parliament, and afford us no manner of supply, but what they part with against their wills'.⁹¹ A despatch to Basil Fielding, Earl of Denbigh, blamed their Royalist support on the 'great power' that 'the cathedral' had in the county.⁹² The Venetian ambassador even noted that the Scots 'find themselves shut in near Sunderland in a country naturally sterile and devastated by the inhabitants to their injury'.⁹³

The Parliamentary and Scots armies therefore had to resort to plundering for food supplies, but they did not stop there. In the autumn of 1644 Sarah Paull, widow of the Royalist William Freeman of Sunderland, 'craveth allowance ... for the [household] goods plundered and taken away from her by the armies, part under the command of Sir William Armine and part by the Scottish army in and about the month of September 1644 ... to the sum of £37 4s 2d.' She also claimed £100 'taken

away after by Armine as forfeited to the state' and £16 for a quarter share of a ship 'which was immediately after the death of the deceased cast away and never came to the hands and possession of this administrix'.⁹⁴ William Freeman had the misfortune to be one of the few Royalists left in Sunderland when the Scots had arrived in March. None the less this paucity of local supplies reinforced the armies' desperate need to import supplies from elsewhere through the port at Sunderland.

'A place of so great consequence to us'

Although Newcastle upon Tyne has often been the focus of historians studying the Civil Wars in the North East, it would be Sunderland that proved to be the key access point for supplying victuals to the over-stretched Scottish army and coals to London during the spring and summer of 1644. The Scots themselves referred to Sunderland as 'a place of so great consequence to us', but by 11 March they had ominously taken possession of 'coals at Lambton and Lumley worth twenty thousand pounds'.⁹⁵

The Parliamentarian commissioners who came to the town were boastful about possessing so much coal, but really wanted the ships coming to the port for coal to 'bring some provisions for the army, especially six-shillings beer, hay or oats'. The Scots army was critically short of supplies as 'five Barques sent from Scotland to us, with provisions are lost, three of them perished, and two were driven into Tyne by extremity of weather, and seized on by the enemy'.⁹⁶ With little to forage the soldiers were near to starvation 'having neither meat or drink' nor 'above twenty and four hours of provisions'. On 22 March Parliament specifically sent butter and corn 'to our Brethren in Sunderland' who were 'in danger of perishing for lack of victuals'.⁹⁷ One shipload of corn that had been seized at Yarmouth in January was

specifically redirected 'to Sunderland for the Scottish army'. Ships also came from Scotland as the *Blessing of Kirkcaldy* came into Sunderland with victuals.⁹⁸

Supply ships and colliers heading to and from Sunderland were an obvious target for Royalists working out of Scarborough as 'Captain Browne Bushell took and brought into Scarborough 6 ships, 4 from Scotland, and 2 from Hull, all laden with arms, ammunition, and provision for these Brethren, with 4 field pieces, and 12 mortar pieces.'⁹⁹ Sir Hugh Cholmley and his Scarborough-based privateers 'succeeded in capturing a total of forty Sunderland vessels, on their passage to London with coals'.¹⁰⁰ Parliament responded by announcing that in 'March 1644, the *Endeavour* and three other of the king's ships were captured off Sunderland', but this did not really compensate for the losses near Scarborough. Retaliation continued for in July 'a ship, loaded with ammunition, small arms and twenty-two pieces of ordnance for Newcastle, was captured and brought into our port [Sunderland]'.¹⁰¹ The experience of William Trotter, who was paid £30 compensation in April 1644, is typical. He 'was taken prisoner to Sunderland, his malt sold, and £30 of the proceeds detained by order of Sir William Armine.'¹⁰²

Sunderland would remain an essential supply base for both the Parliamentarian and Scottish armies in the North for several months. Their commanders sent requests 'to Sunderland for provisions' on 1, 6 and 14 April 1644. Indeed the army 'had no other means of subsistence hithertill but from Sunderland'. Arms were also supplied as '500 of the 2000 muskets with their bandoleers ... now lying at Sunderland' on 6 April were sent onwards to Scottish regiments fighting elsewhere.¹⁰³

A renewed focus on coal

Important as victuals were to the Scots, they also wanted control of Wearside's coal mines. In late March 1644 retreating Royalists had been 'chased to Chester-le-Street, Durham, Bishop Auckland and Brancepeth', with the Scots 'clearing the way up the River as they went'. The Scots had kept pursuing the Royalist army along the Wear towards Lumley Castle specifically 'to clear the River for coals'.¹⁰⁴ Parliament was annoyed that Royalists from Newcastle had 'entered the district of Sunderland where they chastised those who were getting coal to send here [London] and burned the mines, so that London may feel the miss of it which will be unbearable next winter, as they have felled most of the trees in the neighbourhood'.¹⁰⁵ They had also 'hindered the lighters from carrying the coals to the ships', so the Sunderland seamen asked for a convoy system to circumvent this, but this was temporarily disrupted by the battle of Hylton. Apparently there were 'about 120 ships that ride in Sunderland Harbour for coals, and there is so great a quantity of coals already above the ground at the pits ready to be taken away, that they are not to be valued: there is so vast a quantity'.¹⁰⁶

In March 1644 no duties were payable on domestic coal shipments. Previous levies had been difficult to collect as prominent Sunderland coal merchants had refused to pay them.¹⁰⁷ However, a levy on coal and salt was being discussed as Parliamentary and Scottish army salaries had to be paid. It was estimated that there were annually '4,000 tens or 40,000 chaldrons [of coal] at Sunderland'. The Sunderland salt pans belonging to Sir William Lambton normally 'burnt 300 tons of coal, but are at present out of repair'. 300 tons were sent 'for the use of the alum works [near Whitby]'. Sir Lionel Maddison, a prominent Newcastle merchant, questioned whether an impost should be levied on salt and coal for 'both being so

necessary commodities, and though of low and mean value, yet so useful for all, even the meanest people ...' However, he did not think a new levy would affect trade from Sunderland as they were annoyingly prospering whilst the blockade on trade to and from Newcastle continued.¹⁰⁸ Sunderland's coal owners would have disagreed with Maddison, but on 15 July Parliament resolved 'that four shillings a chaldron, Sunderland measure, being after the rate of two shillings a chaldron, London measure, or thereabouts, shall be laid upon all coals to be shipped and transported from port to port. This imposition to continue for six months'. They also ordered that 'no coal, Sunderland measure, shall be sold there at above fourteen shillings the chaldron, the best, and twelve Shillings the chaldron the worst, to be delivered at the ship side' for six months. Also 'no coal shall be transported beyond seas, without the leave of the houses of Parliament, upon pain of forfeiture of ship and coals'.¹⁰⁹

This attempt to regulate Sunderland's coal duties, destinations and prices brought home the economic reality of this borough's support for the Scottish and Parliamentary armies. There would be no free-for-all on coal prices which appeared to play into the hands of the blockaded merchants of Newcastle whose 'economic position was founded entirely on the monopolistic stranglehold they had over the Northern coal trade'. However, they could still not trade and it looked as though 'Parliament was seemingly making every effort to establish Sunderland as a rival to Newcastle.'¹¹⁰ This included suggestions that extra workers should be sent to Sunderland 'to dig coal, and work in the coal pits'. Indeed from May until 'July the House of Commons appears to have devoted a considerable time to the question of the Sunderland [Wearside] collieries'.¹¹¹ The Committee for the Navy was also

involved with these arrangements as new coal workers were to be sent from the south of England.¹¹²

In July 1644 leases of the most productive mines near Sunderland at Lumley and Lambton were avidly sought from Parliament by Sir William Langley, George Lilburne and George Grey as they belonged to 'delinquents' (Royalists and Catholics). They were granted to them on 15 July and Newcastle feared that Sunderland would finally break their cherished monopoly over coal. Langley, Lilburne and Grey were also restored to their existing collieries that had previously been forfeited to the Crown and they were given compensation for coals taken by the enemy.¹¹³ Competition for lucrative Wearside mines continued as the wars went in favour of Parliament and more 'delinquents' were identified. George Lilburne was even accused of harassing Lady Lambton, who had gone to London complaining of his 'hard and unjust usage' of her interests.¹¹⁴ As Lilburne, Langley and Grey were so richly rewarded for their loyalty any opposition they bore towards Parliamentary control of the coal trade would have been somewhat placated.

Sunderland and the Scottish military occupation, 1644-46

Sunderland remained an important town to the Scots and Parliamentary armies during the spring and summer of 1644. Commissioners for the army, commissioners for Parliament and the committee with the Scottish army had all gathered at Sunderland by 1 April. They noted that in contrast to early March Sunderland was now 'a place where is great store of provision' and that the Scots 'hath fortified the Town very well, and secured all places'.¹¹⁵ Although the bulk of the Scots army moved south in early April 1644 General Leslie had acknowledged Sunderland's importance by leaving behind two regiments amounting to a much larger 3,000-

strong garrison with another regiment nearby. 100 prisoners of rank were still held in the town as well, but the ordinary foot soldiers were released.¹¹⁶

The Scots were actively recruiting more men and arms from Scotland. On 13 April 1644 John Colville wrote from Sunderland to David Melville at Raith, near Kirkcaldy in Fife. He granted Melville a receipt for twelve men and their arms, levy and transport money.¹¹⁷ The Sunderland garrisons were also replenished with barrels of gunpowder from London, but there was concern that Leslie's army was solely reliant upon Sunderland for supplies after it had marched south. The committee of the army noted on 21 April (from Tadcaster) that they had 'no other meanes of subsistence hithertills bot from Sunderland'.¹¹⁸ Parliament therefore continued to make supplying the 'Brethren of Scotland' a priority, just as long as the supply ships returned south with coal.¹¹⁹

The Royalists certainly acknowledged their enemies' reliance upon Sunderland for when they quit Lumley Castle, they took some 'forty of our colliers and keelmen' prisoner. This was probably the incident reported by Robert Douglas on 11 April whilst he 'loadeth his party with butter, cheeses, bread, and oats. A party of our musketeer of toward 100 sent from Sunderland to guard the keels near Lumley, surprised by the enemy, and taken.' Nevertheless when Leslie's forces came within 'a mile and half of Durham' on 12 April, Royalist forces quickly moved out of Durham and headed for Yorkshire.¹²⁰

There was some turnover within the garrisons left at Sunderland on 5 May 1644 when Colonel William Stewart of the Galloway Foot regiment was made governor of Sunderland. On the same day the committee of the army ordered the Earl of Lothian's Teviotdale Foot regiment 'to Sunderland, with a horse troop'.¹²¹

Provisions for the army at Sunderland were continually replenished from Scotland, England and local merchants. Common soldiers received their much needed pay in cash and future army loans were guaranteed against the 'coals to be furnished' from Sunderland.¹²²

The soldiers still had to be on their guard for in late May 1644 the Royalist James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, retook South Shields Fort which Leven had initially taken on 20 March.¹²³ The Sunderland garrison later retook the fort, but had to contend with 'the energy of Montrose' who was wreaking havoc in North East England and determined to retake Sunderland. Indeed 'towards the end of May [1644], the town was only saved by the energy of the seamen, who placed themselves under arms, planted cannon on the walls, and with the help of Colonel Charles Fairfax, repulsed Montrose, Musgrave and others engaged in the attempt'.¹²⁴ The seamen's defiant stance earned them a £200 reward from Parliament, though it was not paid until October 1644. The Scots had supplied the seamen with ammunition 'upon compulsion' on 22 May.¹²⁵ A further 500 muskets were bought at Sunderland on 26 May to help arm the town and Colonel Allen received more powder, musket balls and match 'for the use of the seamen under my command', as did others who commanded the seamen.¹²⁶ The seamen also thwarted attempts by Royalists who tried to burn and spoil 'stairs and coals and endeavoured to stop the passage for boats by a dam across the river, which the seamen quickly pulled'.¹²⁷

General Leslie was prevented from coming to Sunderland's aid as he was besieging York at this time. The willing co-operation of the 'gunners, townsmen & seamen' of Sunderland on the side of the Scottish army is therefore considerable and why, as civilians, they were supplied with so many army weapons and

ammunition. However, the Scottish commanders were probably annoyed to record an unfortunate incident when '1 field piece' was 'broken at Sunderland by a sea gunner'.¹²⁸

Any remaining Royalists in Sunderland were severely dealt with by Sir William Armine, as Parliamentary commissioner. He even apprehended the once loyal 'Mr Grey and his fitter [keel crewman], for opposing Parliament and Committee of both kingdoms'. On 20 June Armine assured Sir Henry Vane, the Lord Lieutenant of Durham, that having taken care of Royalist attacks and obstructions 'we hope to find quicker despatch in lading the ships than hitherto'.¹²⁹

Sunderland remained a favoured location of Parliament, even after the Tyne opened up for trade again on 14 November 1644.¹³⁰ Sunderland would continue as a supply base for both the Scots and Parliamentary armies until 1646. For example during the autumn of 1645 arms were still being shipped through Sunderland by the Vanes and Lilburnes. Other goods were still coming through the port for the Scottish army such as 'cloth, linen ...' worth £7,661. 15s. 7d. There was still a Scottish army presence in Sunderland during 1645-6 for in January 1646 the Earl of Lothian's regiment was stationed there.¹³¹

Many northerners feared the Scots, but not so the people of Sunderland. The Scottish soldiers stationed at the Sunderland garrison freely mingled with townsfolk during 1644-46. The ministers who accompanied the Scottish troops tolerated their heavy drinking, but would not have allowed them to abuse of local women. On the contrary, there were a number of marriages at Bishopwearmouth church between local women and Scottish soldiers. On 18 June 1644 William Sommerville married Margaret Moody of Wearmouth, followed on 27 August when Adam Thompson wed

Ursula Bee of Sunderland. This pattern continued for on 20 January 1646 Robert Hay married Mary Horsley of Bishopwearmouth. The births of children to Scottish garrison families are recorded for on 16 August 1644 'Michael, son of Matthew Marshall, soldier of the garrison' was baptised. Five other children of Scotsmen were baptised during 1644-46; George Stephen, Thomas Watson, James Turnbull and finally on 11 November 1646 'Isabel Alexander the daughter of John Alexander of the Scotch Army.' Their mothers were presumably camp followers of their husbands' regiments, though Thomas Harvey, 'son of Wilkin a Scottish man' was presumably illegitimate as he did not have his father's surname.¹³²

'Secure the Toun of Newcastle'

The friendliness of the Scottish occupation of Sunderland contrasted sharply with their attitude towards the occupants of Newcastle upon Tyne. They were still holding out against the Scots and Parliament during the summer of 1644. Indeed the need for more Scottish forces in the North East had been agreed by the Committee of Both Kingdoms on 20 June 1644. Two days earlier David Leslie, Lord Callendar, received instructions from the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh to

reduce and secure the Toun of Newcastle, castle of Tynemouth, and all other places possessed by the enemy ... And make such use of the forces of the Bishopric as may conduce most for these ends, But with a special regard for the safety of the Toun of Sunderland.¹³³

The planned attack on Newcastle by Callendar did not take place as his forces were diverted to the battle at Marston Moor on 2 July 1644, followed by the surrender of York on 16 July. It was not until 12 August that the army advanced to Gateshead, while Leven paid visits of inspection to Sunderland and Hartlepool.¹³⁴ Callendar's army was instructed to consider sheltering at Sunderland or Hartlepool at this time

for Royalist forces were riding north to oppose him at Gateshead. Parliamentary commissioners were still stationed at Sunderland and although the Marquis of Newcastle had fled to Hamburg, the forces of the Marquis of Montrose and Sir Robert Clavering were still feared in the North.¹³⁵

On 23 August 1644 the Committee of Both Kingdoms met at Sunderland to order provisions for the Scots army in the North and they were still there on 30 September as storming Royalist Newcastle was now their priority.¹³⁶ In August weapons were being sent from the Sunderland magazine to assist 'Lord Sinclair's battery against Newcastle upon Tyne'. These arms were replenished with '10,000 lb powder, 10,000 lb lead and 20,000 match' from London.¹³⁷ Knowing that Newcastle was fully under siege the committee of the navy also ordered that 'the ships which are to carry the money and provisions to Sunderland be hastened away with all speed' on 9 September. A further 200 barrels of gunpowder were despatched to Sunderland on 15 September. On 24 September 1644 the Committee for Compounding ordered Robert Carr and his *Samuel Justina*, to Sunderland with yet more supplies 'for the army at Sunderland'. Another pass was granted to 'Thomas Bedell, of the *Hector*, carrying £15,000 to the Scots army near Sunderland', which arrived on 4 October.¹³⁸

Lord Sinclair and his soldiers had been attacking the Sandgate in Newcastle, from across the River Tyne, but the city was not stormed until 19 October 1644. A popular rhyme noted the short-lived bravado that preceded this and Newcastle's poor opinion of Sunderland's alliance with the Scottish army:

Ride through the Sandgate both up and down,
There you'll see the gallants fighting for the crown.
All the cull cuckolds in Sunderland Town,

With all the bonny blue caps cannot pull them down.¹³⁹

The Royalist Newcastle garrison had fully surrendered to the Scots by 22 October and Sir William Armine was quick to move there from Sunderland. On 27 October he was asking Parliament to consider 'what advantage the [Newcastle] coal trade and customs are for the maintenance of their armies'. Parliament wanted to 'employ all the moneys thereupon arising for the use of the army', but they were warned to 'take diligent care that no such course be taken with the coal here as has been done at Sunderland'.¹⁴⁰ This referred to complaints that a corrupt Sunderland custom house was not providing enough money for the army.

Sunderland's custom duties and payments to the Scots army

Hew Kennedy had been appointed collector of customs in 1644 to keep 'account of all entries, cocquets, and payments there [Sunderland]', but he had gone into Yorkshire with the army. The commissioners remaining at Sunderland 'had the sole managing of the excise, customs, and price of the coals in their hands, which apparently they find then so sweet that they have never since been willing that any of us should be conscious unto or have any knowledge of their affairs'.¹⁴¹ James Sword was therefore appointed by the Scottish commissioners to 'sit in the customhouse and excise office in the town of Newcastle and Sunderland' on 18 November 1644. He was to receive all payments and 'keep a key of the chest where the moneys lieth'.¹⁴² Despite these local difficulties the Scottish army had regularly received their pay from Sunderland during 1644. However, their money was mostly shipped in from elsewhere owing to the problems of collecting customs duties at Sunderland.

The pressing need to pay the army continued into 1645. Between 6 October and 1 November 1645 payments to the Scots army amounted to '£53,000 in respect of the sale of coals at Newcastle and Sunderland'. Payments for £200,000, plus £21,000 per month was being demanded by the army by December 1645.¹⁴³ On 3 October 1646 Sir Adam Hepburn of Humble, Collector-General and Treasurer of the Scots army, received a further £400 'forth of the custom house of Sunderland'.¹⁴⁴ Parliament had clearly struggled to pay the Scots army all the money it was promised. Perhaps this is why Sir William Armine, who had long supported the intervention of this army, finally turned against their occupation of North East England.¹⁴⁵ More efficient levying of coal duties and payments sanctioned by the House of Commons ensured that the Scots left England by 11 February 1647 with all their pay, which was very unusual for an early modern army. Laura Stewart estimates that, after much bargaining, the Scots were paid a total of £816,089 for their 1643-47 campaigns in England.¹⁴⁶ Sunderland had, arguably, contributed far more than money to the Scottish campaign with free access to its port facilities and the support of their seamen during the British Civil Wars. Sunderland had therefore played a significant part in the first British Civil Wars.

War could be disastrous for urban communities caught up in campaigns, yet the port of Sunderland benefited economically from the British Civil Wars. Sunderland had taken advantage of the blockade of Newcastle to increase their share of the coal trade in 1644, even though the Wear was not as navigable as the Tyne. The borough's civic leaders, such as George Lilburne, made a considerable fortune out of local coal mine leases. Unlike the merchants of Newcastle, Sunderland's leaders do not appear to have regretted the Scottish occupation or its

costs.¹⁴⁷ The seamen of Sunderland also prospered as increasing trade in and out of Sunderland gave them more employment than before the wars began. The borough's continuing prosperity would, in turn, attract more people to settle and invest in Sunderland. So Sunderland's defiance of 'Mitre, Scepter, and the Crown'¹⁴⁸ in the 1640s was as profitable as it was political.

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¹ C. S. Terry, *The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, First Earl of Leven* (1899); *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant 1643-1647*, ed. C. S. Terry, 2 vols, Scottish History Society (Edinburgh, 1917); *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in London, 1644-1646*, ed. H. W. Meikle, Roxburghe Club (Edinburgh, 1917).

² I. Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653* (Oxford, 1994); R. Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne and the Puritan Revolution. A Study of the Civil War in North England* (Oxford, 1967) and L. Kaplan, *Politics and Religion during the English Revolution. The Scots and the Long Parliament 1643-1645* (New York, 1976).

³ P. Whillis, 'The Experience of the Scottish Occupation in Newcastle and the Bishopric of Durham, 1640-1647' (unpub. M.A. thesis Durham Univ. 2002); Matthew R. Greenhall, 'The Evolution of the British Economy: Anglo-Scottish Trade and Political Union, an Inter-Regional Perspective, 1580-1750' (unpub. Ph.D. thesis Durham Univ. 2011) and 'Economic Causes and Consequences of the Scottish Invasions of North-East England, 1637-1647', *Northern History*, XLIX, 2 (2012), 265-80; M. M. Meikle and C. M. Newman, *Sunderland and its Origins. Monks to Mariners* (Chichester, 2007).

⁴ (N)ational (L)ibrary of (S)cotland, LS 1.18/59 (Pamphlet Series) *The Sunderland Tale. A political satire*. London (?), 1710.

⁵ Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 64-86, 158-9. Leslie became first Earl of Leven on 6 November 1641.

⁶ (C)alendar of (S)tate (P)apers (Dom)estic, 1639-40, pp. 426-27, 566-67. There was also contact between some Puritan Newcastle merchants and the Covenanters at this time. Greenhall, thesis, p. 107.

⁷ CSPDom, 1639-40, pp. 515-20, 541; R. Surtees, *The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham*, (1820), II, 14.

⁸ *CSPDom*, 1640, p.51.

⁹ *CSPDom*, 1639-40, pp. 546-47.

¹⁰ Meikle & Newman, *Sunderland and its Origins*, pp. 108-13. The charter could not be ratified by Parliament as it had not met since March 1629.

¹¹ *CSPDom*, 1640, pp. 346-47.

¹² *CSPDom*, 1640, p. 480.

¹³ Greenhall, thesis, pp. 107, 112.

¹⁴ (N)ational (R)ecords of (S)cotland, Papers of the Douglas Hamilton Family, Dukes of Hamilton and Brandon, GD406/1/1229 quoted in M.C. Fissel, *The Bishops' Wars. Charles I's campaigns against Scotland 1638-1640* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 110.

¹⁵ *CSPDom*, 1640, p. 651.

¹⁶ *CSPDom*, 1640-41, pp. 23-24, 38-39; E.M. Furgol, *A Regimental History of the Covenanting Armies 1639-1651* (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 74.

¹⁷ *CSPDom*, 1640-41, p. 49.

¹⁸ Northampton Record Office, Finch Hatton (Kirby) Collection, FH 860.

¹⁹ Furgol, *Regimental History*, p. 61; M. E. James, *Family, Lineage and Civil Society. A Study of Politics, Religion and Mentality in the Durham Region 1500-1640* (Oxford, 1974), p. 176.

²⁰ *CSPDom*, 1640-41, p. 464.

²¹ Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 88-161.

²² *(C)ommons (J)ournals*, II, 458.

²³ *Durham Protestations 1642*, ed. H.M. Wood, *Surtees Society*, CXXXV (1922), 32-34, 111-15, 149-52.

²⁴ (H)ouse of (L)ords (R)ecord (O)ffice, House of Lords: Journal Office, PO/JO/10/14/8/3575, PO/JO/10/1/90; British Library, *A most lamentable information of the part of the Grievances of Muggleswick Lordship to the Bishoprick of Durham, sent up by Master George Lilburne, Major of Sunderland to be communicated to the House of Commons (1642?)*; *CJ*, III, 18.

²⁵ *(L)ords (J)ournals*, V, 314.

²⁶ *(C)alendar of the (P)roceedings of the (C)ommittee for (C)ompounding ... 1643-1660* (1889), ed. M. A. E. Green, III, 1917-1922.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ *Records of the Committees for Compounding... in Durham and Northumberland ... 1643-60*, ed. R. Welford, SS, CXI (1905), p. 276; W. Dumble, 'The Durham Lilburnes and the English Revolution' in *The Last Principality: Politics, Religion and Society in the Bishopric of Durham, 1494-1660* (Nottingham, 1987), ed. D. Marcombe, pp. 227-52 at p. 230.

³⁰ Cf J. Rhodes, 'The Civil War Defences of Gloucester', *Trans. Bristol & Gloucestershire Archaeological Society*, CXXXII (2014), 159-187; J. Topazio, 'The Impact of the Civil War on Reading', *Southern History*, XXXVI (2014), 13-17; J. Worton, "'The Strongest Works in England'? The Defences of Shrewsbury during the Civil Wars', *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological and Historical Society*, LXXXVII (2014), 95-112.

³¹ *CJ*, II, 916, 923.

³² *CJ*, II, 927.

³³ *LJ*, V, 555.

³⁴ Greenhall, thesis, p. 106.

³⁵ *CJ*, III, 121, 150. *An ordinance with severall propositions of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament; for the speedy raising of forces by sea and land, to reduce the town of Newcastle to obedience to the King and Parliament* (London, 1643). Political loyalty in Newcastle was complex at this time, for whilst the garrison was Royalist, some prominent merchants like Sir Lionel Maddison waived. See J de Groot, 'Commerce, Religion, Loyalty: Royalist Newcastle upon Tyne, 1642-1644', *AA5*, XXVII (1999), 135-44.

³⁶ *CSP Dom*, 1644, p. 31.

³⁷ Sidney Lee, 'Armine, Sir William, first baronet (1593-1651)', rev. Sean Kelsey, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online* (Oxford, 2004). <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/649>].

³⁸ *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 39-40; Furgol, *Regimental History*, p. 408; C. S. Terry, 'The Scottish Campaign in Northumberland and Durham between January and June 1644', *AA3*, XXI (1899), pp. 146-79.

³⁹ *Mercurius Belgicus: or a brief chronology of the battels, sieges, conflicts and other most remarkable passages from the beginning of this rebellion to the 25th March, 1646. Together with a catalogue of the persons of quality slain on both sides.* (1685).

⁴⁰ E. Bowles, *Manifest Truths, OR AN INVERSION OF Truths Manifest. Containing a Narration of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army, and a Vindication of the Parliament and Kingdom of England from the false and injurious aspersions cast on them by the Author of the said Manifest* (London, 1646), p.

3.

⁴¹ *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, p. 4. The suppliers, Thomas Rodbeard & Co cheesemongers of London, were not paid £500 'for butter and cheese for the Scottish army in Sunderland' until 21 August 1644. *CPCC*, I, p. 781.

⁴² The Diary of Robert Douglas is quoted from *Historical Fragments Relative to Scottish Affairs from 1635 to 1664* (Edinburgh, 1833), ed. J. Maidment, p. 52.

⁴³ *An Exact Relation*, pp. 3-4; *The Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army Certifying their passing over Tyne; with the particulars. Together with their possession of Sunderland, and their advance after the enemy, who is fled to Durham* (London 1644), quoted from M.A. Richardson, *Reprints of Rare Tracts & Imprints of Ancient Manuscripts* (Newcastle, 1843-47), no 2, Historical, p. 3.

⁴⁴ A. Baharie, *Tales & Sketches, chiefly of Sunderland and Neighbourhood, painted freely with a full brush* (Sunderland, 1887), pp. 34-35.

⁴⁵ W. C. Mitchell, *History of Sunderland* (Manchester, 1872), p. 57.

⁴⁶ NRS, Registers and Minute Books of the Committee of Estates, 1643-1644, PA11/2 fol. 32v.

Summers, *History and Antiquities of Sunderland*, pp. 412-14.

⁴⁷ Bowles, *Manifest Truth*, p, 3.

⁴⁸ Furgol, *Regimental History*, pp. 113-14. Ludovick Leslie was appointed governor of Tynemouth Castle on 23 November 1644

⁴⁹ W. Fordyce, *The History and Antiquities of the County Palatine of Durham; Comprising a Condensed Account of its Natural, Civil and Ecclesiastical History, from the earliest times to the present time...* (Newcastle, 1846), II, p. 395; Mitchell, *History of Sunderland*, pp. 57, 59.

⁵⁰ *Papers relating to the Army*, I, 109.

⁵¹ *Mercurius Aulicus, Communicating the Intelligence and affaires of the Court, to the rest of the Kingdome. The eleventh weeke, ending March 16, 1643 (1644)*, pp. 881-3.

⁵² NRS, PA11/1 fols 158r, 159r.

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- ⁵³ *Papers relating to the Army*, I, 109; P. Edwards, *Dealing in Death. The arms trade and the British Civil Wars, 1638-52* (Stroud, 2000), p. 105.
- ⁵⁴ *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 42-3.
- ⁵⁵ The National Archives, Secretaries of State: State Papers Domestic, Charles I, Letters and papers, SP16/501 fols 26r-27v.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁵⁸ *Mercurius Aulicus* (16 March 1644), pp. 881-83.
- ⁵⁹ TNA, SP16/501 fols 26r-27v.
- ⁶⁰ *An Exact Relation*, p. 3.
- ⁶¹ *An Exact Relation*, p. 5.
- ⁶² *An Exact Relation*, pp. 4-5; *Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, p. 14.
- ⁶³ *Diary of Robert Douglas*, pp. 52-53.
- ⁶⁴ *Furgol, Regimental History*, p. 112.
- ⁶⁵ *Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, p. 14.
- ⁶⁶ *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant*, I, 115; *The Last Proceedings of the Scots, being a Report by a Messenger sent from the English Commissioners at Sunderland ... Delivered to Parliament on Saturday April 6, 1644 by Master John Hardy* (London, 1644); *Calendar, Committee for the Advance of Money*, ed. M. A. E. Green, II, 1645-50 (1888), 650. *CJ*, III, 425, 567.
- ⁶⁷ *CJ*, III, 421, 425-6; *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners in London, 1644-1646*, ed. H. W. Meikle, Roxburghe Club (Edinburgh, 1917), pp. 11-12.
- ⁶⁸ HLRO PO/JO/10/1/167; *CJ*, III, 432, 434; *LJ*, VI, 480-1; *Die Jovis, 21 Martii, 1643. Whereas the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, by an ordinance of the 14. of Ianuarie, 1642. did for severall reasons in the said ordinance mentioned, prohibite all ships and other vessels, to carry provisions of victualls, armes, or money, unto New-castle, Sunderland, or Blithe...* (London, 1644).
- ⁶⁹ *CSP Dom*, 1644-45, p. 220.
- ⁷⁰ *(C)alendar of (S)tate (P)apers relating to (Venice)*, 1643-47, p. 116.
- ⁷¹ *A true Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, pp. 4-5; Bowles, *Manifest Truths*, p. 4; *Mercurius Aulicus* (30 March, 1644), pp. 912-13; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 208.

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- ⁷² *A true Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, pp. 4-5.
- ⁷³ Diary of Robert Douglas, pp. 54-5; Furgol, *Regimental History*, p. 122.
- ⁷⁴ *The Taking of the Fort at South Shields* quoted from Richardson, *Rare Tracts*, no 2, Historical, pp. 9-11.
- ⁷⁵ *A true Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, pp. 4-5.
- ⁷⁶ TNA SP16/501 fols 26r-27v; *Mercurius Aulicus* (30 March, 1644), pp. 912-13.
- ⁷⁷ *Mercurius Beligicus* (1685).
- ⁷⁸ *A true Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, p. 3; *The True Informer: continuing a collection of the most speciall and observable passages which have been informed from severall parts of his Majesties Dominions 13 April, 1644*, pp. 204-05; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 211.
- ⁷⁹ HMC, *10th Report*, pt IV, appx, p. 72.
- ⁸⁰ *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant*, I, 140; Bowles, *Manifest Truths*, p. 4; Furgol, *Regimental History*, p. 13.
- ⁸¹ Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 211; Terry, *AA3*, p. 173; *The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle*, ed. C.H. Firth, (1907), pp. 200-04.
- ⁸² E. Warburton, *Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers* (1849), II, p. 397.
- ⁸³ W. Lithgow, *A true experimentall and exact relation upon that famous and renowned siege of Newcastle* (Edinburgh, 1645), p. 4.
- ⁸⁴ *The Last Proceedings of the Scots. True Informer, 13 April 1644*, pp. 204-05; (D)urham (R)ecord (O)ffice, Bishopwearmouth Parish Registers, M42/967.
- ⁸⁵ Diary of Robert Douglas, p. 55.
- ⁸⁶ D. S. Evens, 'The Bridge of Boats at Gloucester 1642-44', in *The English Civil War*, ed. S. D. M. Carpenter (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 405-15.
- ⁸⁷ Mitchell, *History of Sunderland*, pp. 61-62. For an example of foraging that allegedly went amiss see Baharie, *Tales & Sketches*, pp. 34-39.
- ⁸⁸ NRS, Registers and Minute Books of the Committee of Estates, 1643-1644, PA11/2 fol 33v.
- ⁸⁹ *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, p. 13.
- ⁹⁰ *An Exact Relation*, p. 4.
- ⁹¹ *Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, pp. 11-12.

⁹² HMC, *4th Report*, pt I, appx, p. 264.

⁹³ *CSP Venice*, 1643-7, p. 87.

⁹⁴ Durham University Library Archives and Special Collections, Durham Probate Registry, DPR 1644.

⁹⁵ *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer: Sent Abroad to prevent mis-information. From Wednesday the 6th March to Wednesday the 13 of Mar. 1644; A true Relation of the Proceedings of the Scottish Army from the 12 of March* (London, 1644), pp. 1-2.

⁹⁶ *An Exact Relation of the Last Newes from the Quarters of His Excellency, the Lord Generall of the Scottish Army. Dated from Sunderland March 12, 1643 [1644]* (London 1644), pp. 1-2; *Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, p. 14.

⁹⁷ *CPCC*, I, p. 7; *Late Proceedings of the Scottish Army*, p. 14.

⁹⁸ *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 46, 57; *LJ*, V, 555; *CJ*, III, 432, 434.

⁹⁹ *MERCURIUS AULICUS Communicating the Intelligence and affaires of the Court, to the rest of the KINGDOME. The thirteenth Weeke, ending March 30, 1644.* (1644), pp. 912-13.

¹⁰⁰ Mitchell, *History of Sunderland*, p. 61; J. Binns, 'A Place of Great Importance' *Scarborough in the Civil Wars, 1640-60* (Preston, 1996), pp. 110-13.

¹⁰¹ Mitchell, *History of Sunderland*, p. 61.

¹⁰² *CPCC*, I, p. 5.

¹⁰³ NRS, PA11/2 fols 39v, 41r, 42v, 45v.

¹⁰⁴ *The Last Proceedings of the Scots.*

¹⁰⁵ *CSP Venice*, 1643-7, p. 106.

¹⁰⁶ *The Last Proceedings of the Scots.*

¹⁰⁷ East Sussex Record Office, The Glynde Place Archives, GLY/418, GLY/493-96; *CJ*, IV, 85. *LJ*, VI, 257-59.

¹⁰⁸ *CSP Dom*, 1644-45, pp. 98-99.

¹⁰⁹ *CJ*, III, 561-62.

¹¹⁰ Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne*, pp. 158-9.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*; *CJ*, III, 501, 503, 538, 549.

¹¹² *CJ*, III, 501, 538, 562.

¹¹³ *CSP Dom*, 1644, p. 393; *CJ*, iii, 561; Howell, *Newcastle upon Tyne*, pp. 158-59.

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- ¹¹⁴ *CSP Dom*, 1644-45, pp. 328-29.
- ¹¹⁵ *The Last Proceedings of the Scots. Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, pp. 9, 13, 14-15, 17-18, 20.
- ¹¹⁶ *The Last Proceedings of the Scots*.
- ¹¹⁷ NRS, Leven and Melville Muniments, GD26/9/127.
- ¹¹⁸ *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, p. 21.
- ¹¹⁹ *CJ*, III, 444-45.
- ¹²⁰ *The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer: Sent Abroad to prevent mis-information. From Tuesday the 18th April to Thursday the 25th April. 1644*, p. 415; *Diary of Robert Douglas*, p. 55.
- ¹²¹ Furgol, *Regimental History*, pp. 141, 181-83.
- ¹²² NRS, PA11/2, fols 47v-48r, 50v-51r, 52v, 55v.
- ¹²³ *[A]cts of the [P]arliament of [S]cotland*, ed. T. Thomson & C. Innes (Edinburgh, 1814-75), VI, pt 1, pp. 313-324; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 284-85.
- ¹²⁴ *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 241-42, 255; B. Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs* (London, 1732), I, p. 89. See also Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 286.
- ¹²⁵ *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant*, I, 108-09; Mitchell, *History of Sunderland*, pp. 63-64; Whitelock, *Memorials of the English Affairs*, I, p. 89.
- ¹²⁶ NRS, PA11/2 fol. 55v; PA16/2/10/1.
- ¹²⁷ *CSP Dom*, 1644, p. 255.
- ¹²⁸ *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant*, I, pp. 115, 140.
- ¹²⁹ *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 242, 255; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 286.
- ¹³⁰ *CJ*, IV, 252; VII, 64.
- ¹³¹ *CSP Dom*, 1645-47, pp. 155, 166-67, 183; *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, p. 156.
- ¹³² DRO, M42/967.
- ¹³³ *APS*, VI, pt 1, p. 112; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 287-89.
- ¹³⁴ Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 287-89, 295.
- ¹³⁵ NRS, PA 11/2 fols 70r-71v; *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 385-86; *The Taking of Gateshead Hill: And Blocking up of Newcastle certified in a Letter from the Commissioners at Sunderland (1644)*.
- ¹³⁶ *CPCC*, I, p. 8; *CJ*, III, 604, 630, 645.

¹³⁷ NRS, PA11/2 fols 74r-75v.

¹³⁸ NRS PA11/2 fol 91r; *CSP Dom*, 1644, pp. 383-4; *CPCC*, I, pp. 11, 782; IV, pp. 2964-65.

¹³⁹ J. G. Garbutt, *A Historical and Descriptive View of the Parishes of Monkwearmouth and Bishopwearmouth and the Port and Borough of Sunderland* (Sunderland, 1819), p. 134.

¹⁴⁰ *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, pp. 42, 47; *ODNB*, 'Armine, Sir William, first baronet (1593-1651)'.

¹⁴¹ *Correspondence of the Scots Commissioners*, p. 47.

¹⁴² NRS, PA11/2 fol 112r.

¹⁴³ *LJ*, VIII, 34-6; Terry, *Alexander Leslie*, p. 385.

¹⁴⁴ *Papers relating to the Army of the Solemn League and Covenant*, II, p. 615.

¹⁴⁵ NRS, Army: Pay and Equipment: Receipts 1645, PA16/2/11; *CJ*, IV, 654; *ODNB*, 'Armine, Sir William, first baronet (1593-1651)'.

¹⁴⁶ Gentles, *New Model Army*, p. 145; L.A.M. Stewart, 'English Funding of the Scottish Armies in England and Ireland, 1640-1648', *The Historical Journal*, LII, 3 (2009), 573-93 at p. 583.

¹⁴⁷ Dumble, in Marcombe, *The Last Principality*; De Groot, AA5, XXVI; Greenhall, *NH*, XLIX, 2.

¹⁴⁸ NLS, *The Sunderland Tale. A political satire*.

- Castle
- ▲ Civil war camp
- ✕ Skirmishes
- ☎ Cannon fire
- ➔ Directional arrows
- River crossing

